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Abstract 
In this paper it is shown that more generous early retirement provisions as well as lower 
employment lead to lower steady state pension rates if governments weigh the welfare 
of the older persons relatively strongly. A relatively stronger weight on the welfare of 
the young reverses the results. The driving forces behind those findings are 
governments that cannot commit to pension policies and consequently take into account 
future governments' policies when maximizing electoral support from the currently 
young and old constituencies. 
Zusammenfassung 
In dem Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass Pensionssysteme mit generöseren 
Frühverrentungsregelungen sowie niedrigere Beschäftigungsquoten geringere 
Pensionen zur Folge haben, falls Regierungen die Wohlfahrt der Pensionäre stärker 
gewichten als die der jüngeren Generation. Gewichtet die jeweilige Regierung in ihrer 
Entscheidung über die Pensionspolitik die Wohlfahrt der jüngeren Generation stärker 
als die der älteren Generation, so kehrt sich das Ergebnis ins Gegenteil um. Die 
Ergebnisse beruhen im Wesentlichen auf der Annahme, dass die Pensionspolitiken 
heutiger Regierungen für zukünftige Regierungen nicht bindend sind. Im Bestreben um 
die maximale Zustimmung der heutigen Wählerschaft berücksichtigen Regierungen 
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Most modern pension systems incorporate redistributive elements within gen-
erations. These come in various disguises, such as unemployment benefit or
disability pensions, and vary in generosity across countries (see Blo¨ndal and
Scarpetta (1998)).
The purpose of this paper is to study the incentives for short-lived gov-
ernments to introduce time-consistent pension policies in a PAYGO system
that also redistributes between the employed and the unemployed. To ex-
amine this question, I use and extend the framework provided by Grossman
and Helpman (1998).1 The derived results may guide empirical work that




The model has an overlapping generations structure. There is no population
growth. Each generation lives for two periods. At every time t there shall
be four distinct groups. Young voters denoted by Y are either employed (E)
or unemployed (U). Old voters (O) can also be of two distinct types: in
one case they were employed when young, in the other case they were not.
The fraction of employed voters (0 < ρ < 1) shall be constant over time.
There is no labour supply decision of individuals. Those lucky enough to
1There are highly recommendable surveys on the political economy of pension systems
by Breyer (1994), Galasso and Profeta (2002) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999).
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have a job earn a wage w = 1. Those who do not have a job when young
derive utility from leisure l. The young save all their disposable income in
order to consume when they are old. There shall be a storage technology
in terms of a non-perishable good produced by the young. Saved output
earns a gross return R = 1 + r, where r > 0 shall also denote the time
discount rate. The disposable income of an individual is given by 1 − τt,
where 0 ≤ τt ≤ 1 levied on the working part of the population is a tax at
time t that finances the social security system. The government allocates the
proceeds from labour taxation to the pension system. Those old individuals
who have an employment record receive a regular pension pt. Individuals who
did not work when young receive an early retirement payment of γ · pt, with
0 < γ < 1. The latter group is the extreme version of people who have an
incomplete working history – they have never worked at all. The government
awards them early retirement pensions as a fraction of the regular pension
rate.
Denoting with V i the utility of an individual who belongs to group i, and
assuming a linear and time separable utility function, one gets:










V O,Et = stR + pt (3)
V O,Ut = γpt. (4)
The state variable st+1 = 1−τt denotes the savings net interest payments that
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will be available to the currently young when they are old. Thus, the utility
of an employed young person is the sum of leisure l = 0 when young plus the
discounted utility of income that he will draw on for consumption when old.
This income during old age will be the sum of the savings plus the interest on
it plus the expected pension payments pet+1. The unemployed young person
derives utility from leisure when young and discounts the expected early
retirement payments that he will receive when old. The currently old with
a complete working history derive utility from their savings and the regular
pension. The early retirees derive utility from the early retirement pension
γ · pt. Because only self-fulfilling equilibria will be studied in the remainder
of this paper, expectations e equal actual outcomes so that, as a result, the
superscript will be dropped.
2.2 Governments
Governments are short-lived. The policy choice is over the pension pt at
time t only. There is no such device available which would ensure that a
policy pt set in time t given the state variable st is not changed in t + 1, as
it happens to be the case that st+1 6= st. Thus, a policy that was optimal in
time t given st will be undone in t + 1 as the state of the economy changes
to st+1. The lack of such a commitment device has important repercussions.
A choice of a policy at time t that would neglect that future governments
might have an incentive to change the current social security system would
be time-inconsistent (see Kydland and Prescott (1977)). In order to optimize
on its political support, the current government has to look ahead and take
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into account the policy which the next government will pursue, as this policy
affects the well-being of its currently young constituency who will then be
old. If one assumes that the expected policies only depend on the expected
state variable, the pension rate becomes a function of st+1. Hence, what one
is looking for is a ‘Markov political equilibrium’.
Governments optimize an objective function
max
pt
G = ρV Y,E + (1− ρ)V Y,U + θ(ρV O,E + (1− ρ)V O,U) (5)
where θ ≥ 0 is a weight that the government attaches to the welfare of the
currently old generation relative to the young generation. The utilities of the
employed and unemployed enter with the weights ρ and 1− ρ, respectively.2
The pensions are financed by the young and working generation. The
government is obliged to run a balanced budget so that
ρpt + (1− ρ)γpt = ρτt (6)
has to hold. The left-hand side of equation (6) is the sum of regular pensions
paid to those old persons who have a complete working history and the
early retirement pensions paid to the fraction of the population 1 − ρ with
an incomplete working history. The outlays are financed by social security
contributions from the employed young. Using (6) and st+1 = 1 − τt, the
2Such a government objective function can be rationalized with a probabilistic voting
model (see Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)).
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state variable can also be written as
st+1 = 1−Kpt (7)
with





By inserting the utilities of the four electoral groups into the objective func-
tion (5) and using equation (7), one arrives at the first order condition for









+ θρ+ θ(1− ρ)γ = 0. (8)
A policy pt that satisfies (8) buys the current government maximum sup-
port. Integration with respect to st+1 and rearranging yields the first order
difference equation pt+1 = f(pt), which describes the law of motion for the
time-consistent policies as
pt+1 = C +R(θ − 1) ρ
ρ+ γ(1− ρ) −R(θ − 1)pt. (9)
The free parameter C depends on the beliefs that the current government
holds about the retirement policies of its successor. Thus, one has multiple
equilibria of pension policies, as along any path of pension policies pt+1 =
f(pt) the government maximizes its political support. If it were to reduce the
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pensions in period t by one unit, then the marginal loss in political support
among the old would be θρ + θ(1 − ρ)γ, with the first part being the loss
among those with a complete employment record and the second part being
the loss among those with an incomplete working history. But if the current
government expects a policy pt+1 = f(pt) of the follow-up government, the
marginal loss among the old is fully compensated by a marginal gain in
political support among the young of the same amount θρ+ θ(1− ρ)γ. This
can be checked by making use of equation (9), inserting it into the support
function of the young, which is the first part of the right-hand side of equation
(5), and taking the derivative with respect to pt.




1 +R(θ − 1) +
R(θ − 1)
1 +R(θ − 1)
ρ
ρ+ γ(1− ρ) (10)







As long as the government does not attach too high a relative weight to
either the old or the young generation, the pension system will converge to
the steady state.
The steady state is furthermore feasible if pensions are such that those
lucky enough to have been offered a job are willing to accept it V Y,E > V Y,U ,
and pensions can be financed. The former condition implies pt+1 >
R
1−γ (l −
(1− τt)). As the right-hand side of this inequality becomes largest for τt = 1,
a sufficient condition for pensions that fulfil the incentive compatibility is
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p > R · l/(1 − γ). Pensions can be financed if the tax rate does not exceed
one. Thus, the upper limit on the pension rate follows from equation (6) as
p = 1/K. There is no restriction on the belief parameter C, so that for a
sufficiently low leisure value l one will always find a steady state pension rate
p∗ that fulfills p < p∗ < p.
Given a feasible pension system with a stable steady-state pension rate,
three cases can be distinguished:
1. The governments attach the same weight to the two generations (θ =
1): then the steady state pension is fixed by the belief parameter,
p∗ = C.
2. The governments favour the young such that R−1
R
< θ < 1: then a more
generous early retirement scheme yields a higher steady state pension
rate p∗ as can be checked with ∂p∗/∂γ > 0. Higher employment leads
to a lower steady state pension (∂p∗/∂ρ < 0).
3. The governments favour the old such that 1 < θ < R+1
R
: then a more
generous early retirement scheme will result in a lower steady state pen-
sion rate. Secondly, more employment yields a more generous steady
state pension rate.
Note that a more redistributive pension system comes along with a higher
steady state pension rate when governments put a relatively higher weight on
the young. Even though more transfers to those with an incomplete working
history have to be financed by the employed young, the current government
(and all consecutive governments) introduces a higher pension rate in steady
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state. This is so because a higher pension rate raises support for the current
government among the old. Furthermore, the current government knows that
the follow-up government has the same preference for the young, so that the
currently young will profit from the higher steady state pension rate when
they are old. In the other case, with a relatively higher weight on the old,
a more redistributive pension system will coincide with lower steady state
pension rates. Here, the current government reduces the burden for the
young, as it correctly expects that the follow-up government will implement
the same policy, yielding lower pension for the currently young when they
are old.
3 Conclusions
This model of redistribution within and between generations in which govern-
ments cannot commit to a pension system illustrates potentially rich policy
patterns. Comparing steady state pension rates, one finds that those rates
increase with employment and fall with the generosity of an early retirement
scheme if governments put a relatively stronger weight on the older genera-
tion. Should the governments favour the young relatively more, pension rates
fall as employment increases and become more generous with a more gener-
ous early retirement scheme. The model may guide empirical work analyzing
an astonishingly huge variation in pension rates across countries and time,
with those countries having also experienced quite distinct labour market
developments, and possibly young and old constituencies that are organized
to very different degrees.
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